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I. INTRODUCTION
When Fulton v. City of Philadelphia appeared on the Supreme Court’s docket,
the faith-based foster care case threatened to upend American jurisprudence under
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the Free Exercise Clause.1 The First Amendment forbids the federal government
from prohibiting the free exercise of religion, and the Fourteenth Amendment
binds state governments to this restriction.2 Under the Supreme Court’s current
interpretation, government may create neutral and generally applicable laws that
have an incidental effect on religious conduct.3 Government may not target
religious conduct without narrowly tailoring its regulation to a compelling
interest.4 Employment Division v. Smith confirmed that government may
criminalize specified conduct, even if a religious sect has incorporated that conduct
into its rituals.5 Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye v. City of Hialeah built on Smith
to hold that government cannot treat ritualized conduct less favorably than
comparable secular conduct.6
But when presented with Fulton, Chief Justice John Roberts employed a
“dizzying series of maneuvers” to produce a unanimous decision that satisfied
religious liberty interests without diminishing anti-discrimination’s weight as a
compelling interest.7 This may be the Chief Justice’s “greatest judicial magic trick”
yet, but it merely delays an inevitable confrontation between religious liberty and
anti-discrimination.8
The standard contract the City of Philadelphia (“City”) enters into with its
foster care agencies includes provisions that prohibit discrimination on the basis
of sexual orientation.9 The City contracted with dozens of agencies to administer

1. See Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, 140 S. Ct. 1104 (2020) (No. 19–123) (argued Nov. 4, 2020)
(presenting the question of whether to “revisit” Emp. Div., Dep’t of Human Res. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990)).
2. U.S. CONST. amend. I (referring expressly to Congress in its prohibition of laws directed against any
religion but interpreted as applying to the whole federal government); U.S. CONST. amend. XIV; Cantwell v.
Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303 (1940) (noting that the “fundamental concept of liberty embodied in the
[Fourteenth] Amendment embraces the liberties guaranteed by the First Amendment”).
3. See Emp. Div., Dep’t of Human Res. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 878 (1990) (“[I]f prohibiting the exercise
of religion . . . is not the object[,] but merely the incidental effect of a generally applicable and otherwise valid
provision, the First Amendment has not been offended.”).
4. See Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 531–32 (1993) (finding a
law that banned religious animal sacrifice insufficiently tailored to the compelling interests of public safety and
preventing animal cruelty).
5. See 494 U.S. at 890 (upholding the state’s criminalization of the possession of peyote, despite its use in
religious rituals).
6. See 508 U.S. 520, 543–44 (1993) (striking down a public ordinance that “failed to prohibit nonreligious
conduct that endangered [claimed] interests in a similar or greater degree”).
7. See id. at 1882 (acknowledging the City’s interest in “the equal treatment of prospective foster parents
and foster children” is a “weighty one”); Mark Joseph Stern, John Roberts Just Pulled Off His Greatest Judicial
Magic Trick, SLATE (June 17, 2021, 2:00 PM), https://slate.com/news-and-politics/2021/06/john-robertsphiladelphia-adoption-supreme-court.html (on file with the University of the Pacific Law Review); see also
Roberts v. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 624 (1984) (holding that eliminating discrimination is a compelling interest).
8. Stern, supra note 7; see also Holly Hoffman, Court Requires Religious Exemption but Leaves Many
Questions Unanswered, SCOTUSBLOG (June 22, 2021), https://www.scotusblog.com/2021/06/court-requiresreligious-exemption-but-leaves-many-questions-unanswered/ (on file with the University of the Pacific Law
Review) (“Fulton and Masterpiece have done little to help lower courts, and the same conflicts will keep
coming.”).
9. Fulton, 141 S. Ct. at 1878.
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foster care services, including Catholic Social Services (“CSS”).10 For over 100
years, CSS has held caring for vulnerable children as a core Christian value and an
integral part of its religious ministry.11 However, CSS also holds the belief that
certifying any same-sex couple as foster parents would violate its religious views
on marriage.12
After a local newspaper reported that CSS refused to work with same-sex
couples, the City decided against renewing its contract unless CSS agreed to
comply with its anti-discrimination terms.13 CSS refused and filed a lawsuit
alleging, among other claims, that the City violated its First Amendment right to
exercise its religious beliefs free from government interference.14 CSS sought an
order requiring the City to enter into a contract with CSS that accommodates its
refusal to certify same-sex couples as suitable foster parents.15 The trial court and
court of appeals in the Third District denied CSS its request citing Smith, but the
Supreme Court reversed and remanded in a unanimous decision.16
A majority of the Court held that the City’s contract terms were not generally
applicable because provisions granted exemptions at commissioner’s “sole
discretion.”17 This triggered strict scrutiny consistent with Smith and Lukumi,
thereby avoiding the reconsideration of Smith that CSS requested.18 The Court
likely had a different majority willing to overrule Smith, but the Chief Justice
prioritized a unanimous decision over a broad victory for religious liberty,
narrowly preserving free-exercise jurisprudence in the United States.19
The Chief Justice and majority were wise to uphold judicial norms and avoid
overruling Smith.20 A regime of strict scrutiny would sanctify discrimination as
10. Fulton v. City of Philadelphia, 922 F.3d 140, 147–48 (2019), rev’d by 141 S. Ct. 1868 (2021).
11. See Fulton, 141 S. Ct. at 1875 (noting that the CSS contracted with the City to provide foster care
services for over 50 of those years); Fulton, 922 F.3d at 147.
12. See Fulton, 922 F.3d at 148 (relaying that the Secretary of CSS replied to allegations of discrimination
as only adhering to Catholic teachings regarding marriage).
13. See id. at 148–51 (noting that the article prompted the Philadelphia City Council to adopt a resolution
stating that the City’s laws “protect its people from discrimination that occurs under the guise of religious
freedom” and any “agency which violates City contract rules in addition to the Fair Practices Ordinance should
have their contract with the City terminated with all deliberate speed”); see also Julia Terruso, Two Foster
Agencies in Philly Won’t Place Kids with LGBTQ People, PHILA. INQUIRER (Mar. 13, 2018),
https://www.inquirer.com/philly/news/foster-adoption-lgbtq-gay-same-sex-philly-bethany-archdiocese20180313.html (on file with the University of the Pacific Law Review) (reporting that Bethany Christian Services
and CSS “operate under policies that turn away LGBTQ people who come knocking”).
14. See Fulton, 922 F.3d at 146 (stating that CSS brought this action claiming that the City has violated its
rights under the First Amendment’s Free Exercise, Establishment, and Free Speech Clauses, as well as under
Pennsylvania’s Religious Freedom Protection Act).
15. See id. at 153 n.8 (noting that the remedy CSS seeks is “highly unusual” but focusing instead on
reviewing CSS’s claim on the merits).
16. Fulton, 141 S. Ct. 1868.
17. Id. at 1878–89.
18. Id. at 1876–77.
19. See Stern, supra note 7 (crediting Roberts with upholding “a landmark precedent that a supermajority
of the court apparently wants to overturn”).
20. See infra Section V.B (discussing avoidance and precedence).
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religious conduct, transforming the Free Exercise Clause from a protective shield
into a harmful weapon.21 Strict scrutiny provokes the evaluation of religious belief,
which judges should avoid.22 But confrontation between religious liberty and antidiscrimination is inevitable.23 When the next conflict comes, the Court should
strengthen Smith and reinforce the foundational wall separating church and state.24
Part II examines the origins of separationism in America as a defense against
religious discrimination and separationism’s influence on the Constitution’s
Framers.25 Part III tracks the struggle between separationists and
accommodationists over standards of review for free exercise claims.26 Part IV
reviews the majority decision in Fulton and the concurring opinions.27 Part V
provides a missing dissent to the Fulton opinions and argues that strict scrutiny
invokes evaluations of religious belief, which is not the work of judges.28 Part VI
concludes that in future confrontations, the Court should strengthen the separation
of church and state to protect the rights and interests of believers and nonbelievers
alike.29
II. FORTIFICATION: SEPARATIONISM’S FOUNDATIONAL WALL
Before the Revolutionary War, nine of the American colonies established an
official religion and persecuted religious dissidents.30 The Massachusetts Bay
Colony famously executed women for alleged witchcraft and exiled dissidents
from the state, executing them if they returned.31 When the colony banished
religious-liberty pioneer Roger Williams in January 1636, he was without bed or
bread for fourteen weeks.32 Years later, Williams called for “a wall of separation
21. See Howard Gillman & Erwin Chemerinsky, The Weaponization of the Free Exercise Clause,
ATLANTIC (Sept. 18, 2020), https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2020/09/weaponization-free-exerciseclause/616373/ (on file with the University of the Pacific Law Review) (warning that the Court’s “conservative
majority is in the process of transforming this First Amendment clause into a sword that politically powerful
Christian conservatives can use to strike down hard-fought advances in civil rights, especially for LGBTQ
individuals and women”).
22. Infra Section V.C.
23. See generally Hoffman, supra note 8 (noting that Fulton does not clarify much for courts lower courts).
24. Infra Part VI.
25. Infra Part II.
26. Infra Part III.
27. Infra Part IV.
28. Infra Part V.
29. Infra Part VI.
30. See ERWIN CHEMERINSKY & HOWARD GILLMAN, THE RELIGION CLAUSES 30 (2020) (noting that five
colonies promptly disestablished when the Revolutionary War started); see also Douglas Laycock, Continuity
and Change in the Threat to Religious Liberty: The Reformation Era and the Late Twentieth Century, 80 MINN.
L. REV. 1047, 1066–67 (1996) (observing that “the American colonies repeated European mistakes on a smaller
scale”).
31. See Carla Gardina Pestana, The Quaker Executions as Myth and History, 80 J. AM. HIST. 441, 442
(1993) (reviewing facts and hyperbole).
32. John M. Barry, God, Government, and Roger Williams’ Big Idea, SMITHSONIAN MAG. (Jan. 2012),
https://www.smithsonianmag.com/history/god-government-and-roger-williams-big-idea-6291280/ (on file with
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between the garden of the Church and the wilderness of the world” in a pamphlet
advocating to found a new colony.33 When Williams established that colony in
what later became Rhode Island, it became the “western world’s first experiment
with the idea of whether liberty of conscience could coexist with civil peace.”34
Williams’ separationism originated from his fear that the practical concerns of
governing would inevitably corrupt the church.35 Generations later, Thomas
Jefferson also argued for church and state separation but to protect secular interests
“against ecclesiastical depredations and incursions” instead.36 Constitutional
Framer James Madison presented a third rationale: Decentralizing power assured
religious sects would compete against each other, but none would dominate.37
In early drafts of the First Amendment, Madison endeavored to prohibit states
from violating “equal rights of conscience.”38 This language echoed Rhode
Island’s original charter and ten of the contemporary state constitutions protecting
religions.39 However, the First Amendment ultimately prohibited the federal
government—not state governments—from establishing a religion or abridging the
“free exercise” of “religion.”40 The Free Exercise Clause follows the Establishment
Clause, which prohibits “law[s] respecting the establishment of religion.”41 These
“Religion Clauses” represented a “breathtakingly secular vision of government”
compared to contemporary prevailing law in England, the American colonies, and
the states after Independence.42
When Thomas Jefferson won the presidential election of 1800, Connecticut
was one of three states still maintaining official religions, nearly ten years after the
First Amendment took effect.43 The Danbury Baptist Association wrote to
Jefferson conveying concern that—as a minority in the state—it only had access
to religious liberty “as favors granted, and not as inalienable rights.”44 The
President responded by promising to zealously pursue the interests of his
the University of the Pacific Law Review).
33. CHEMERINSKY & GILLMAN, supra note 30, at 26.
34. Edward J. Eberle, Roger Williams on Liberty of Conscience, ROGER WILLIAMS L. REV. 289, 301
(2005).
35. Barry, supra note 32.
36. See CHEMERINSKY & GILLMAN, supra note 30, at 60 (quoting LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1158–60 (2d ed. 1988)).
37. THE FEDERALIST NO. 10 (James Madison).
38. See NEIL H. COGAN, THE COMPLETE BILL OF RIGHTS: THE DRAFTS, DEBATES, SOURCES, AND ORIGINS
1–5 (Oxford Univ. Press 2d ed. 2015) (showing Madison’s drafts June 8 – September 3, 1789).
39. CHEMERINSKY & GILLMAN, supra note 30, at 30.
40. See U.S. CONST. amend. I (referring expressly to Congress in its prohibition of laws directed against
any religion but interpreted as applying to the whole federal government). But see Justice Sandra Day O’Connor,
Liberty, Not Licentiousness, LIBERTY MAG. (Nov./Dec. 1997), http://libertymagazine.org/article/liberty-notlicentiousness (on file with the University of the Pacific Law Review) (including a contrasting view of the founders
and a discussion of what the words “free exercise” meant to them).
41. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
42. CHEMERINSKY & GILLMAN, supra note 30, at 35–36.
43. Id. at 37.
44. Id.
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constituents.45 He wrote that people do not have to account for their religion to
anyone: Government’s powers only legitimately regulate actions, not beliefs.46
Echoing Williams’ wall imagery, Jefferson went on to celebrate the First
Amendment’s protections and hoped for future progress.47 Jefferson wrote:
I contemplate with sovereign reverence that act of the whole American
people which declared that their legislature should “make no law
respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise
thereof,” thus building a wall of separation between Church & State.
Adhering to this expression of the supreme will of the nation in behalf of
the rights of conscience, I shall see with sincere satisfaction the progress
of those sentiments which tend to restore to man all his natural rights,
convinced he has no natural right in opposition to his social duties.48
In the following decades, the Supreme Court generally maintained the
principle that people could not excuse their conduct merely because of their
religious belief.49 To hold otherwise, “would be to make the professed doctrines of
religious belief superior to the law of the land, and in effect to permit every citizen
to become a law unto [one]self.”50 President Jefferson did not live to see it, but the
Court ruled in 1940 that the Free Exercise Clause was binding to all states.51 In
Cantwell v. Connecticut, the Court struck down a statute empowering a state
official to determine whether a cause was religious, violating the Fourteenth
Amendment’s bar against depriving liberty without due process.52 Separationism
and its wall imagery originated as protection of religious liberty; the policy endures
because it protects against the harm that extreme religious liberty can cause.53

45. Jefferson’s Letter to the Danbury Baptists: The Final Letter, as Sent, LIBR. OF CONGRESS,
https://www.loc.gov/loc/lcib/9806/danpre.html (on file with the University of the Pacific Law Review).
46. Id.; see also infra Section V.C (discussing the necessity to account for religious beliefs in strict
scrutiny).
47. Jefferson’s Letter to the Danbury Baptists, supra note 45.
48. Id. But see Eberle, supra note 34, 301 (noting Williams’s obscurity at the time despite similarity in the
language of Jefferson, Locke, and Madison).
49. See Braunfield v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599 (1961) (upholding a Sunday closing law that left fewer days to
compete for Orthodox Jewish claimants, whose traditional day of rest is Saturday not Sunday); Prince v.
Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944) (applying child labor laws to the distribution of religious magazines);
Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1878) (upholding polygamy laws as applied to members of the Morman
faith). Contra Fulton v. City of Philadelphia, 141 S. Ct. 1868, 1907–15 (2021) (Alito, J., concurring in judgment)
(presenting an alternate historical view).
50. Reynolds, 98 U.S. at 167 (1878).
51. 310 U.S. 296 (1940).
52. Id. at 303–05 (finding that the Fourteenth Amendment rendered “states as incompetent as Congress to
enact” law establishing or prohibiting the free exercise of religion).
53. See CHEMERINSKY & GILLMAN, supra note 30, at 162 (“[T]he concerns of the framers—which are
even more powerful today in a far more religiously diverse society—should lead us to separate government as
much as possible from associating itself with religious beliefs, practices, and symbols.”).
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III. BATTLE LINES: STANDARDS OF REVIEW IN FREE EXERCISE CLAIMS
Two interpretations of the Free Exercise Clause predominate American
jurisprudence.54 “Accommodationists” believe the Free Exercise Clause grants
exemptions from generally applicable laws to religious believers.55 Thus, they
advocate for using strict scrutiny in free exercise claims, which requires a
compelling interest whenever the government substantially burdens religion.56
“Separationists” advocate for rational basis review and interpret the Free Exercise
Clause to merely prohibit the government’s affirmative interference with a
person’s free exercise of religion.57 Section A discusses individual cases that serve
as the accommodationist basis for strict scrutiny.58 Section B reviews the
development of separationists’ rational basis standard.59 Section C examines the
response of statutory strict scrutiny in free exercise claims and its impact at the
state level.60
A. Sources of Strict Scrutiny from the Twentieth Century
The Supreme Court has generally held a separationist view of the Free
Exercise Clause: The First Amendment does not relieve people of the duty to obey
“valid and neutral law[s] of general applicability” based on what their religion
condones or condemns.61 The Court denied exemptions for laws restricting local
business operating hours, child labor, and polygamy despite their burdens on the
claimants’ religions.62 However, accommodationists point to two decisions as the
basis for their strict scrutiny standard of review: Sherbert v. Verner and Wisconsin
v. Yoder.63
54. See id. at 12–17 (delineating the divide between interpretations).
55. See id. at 14 (describing accommodationists as calling for strict scrutiny “when the government
substantially burdens religion” and requiring government to “adopt the approach that imposes the least restriction
on religious liberty, even if that means exempting religious practitioners from laws that everyone else has to
obey”).
56. CHEMERINSKY & GILLMAN, supra note 30, at 14.
57. See CHEMERINSKY & GILLMAN, supra note 30, at 13 (defining separationists as believing government
should “stay out of the business of worship and the internal operations of religious institutions; that is . . . not act
with animus toward religion.”)
58. Infra Section II.A.
59. Infra Section II.B.
60. Infra Section II.C.
61. Emp. Div., Dep’t of Human Res. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 879 (1990) (“[D]ecisions have consistently
held that the right of free exercise does not relieve an individual of the obligation to comply with a ‘valid and
neutral law of general applicability on the ground that the law proscribes (or prescribes) conduct that his religion
prescribes (or proscribes).’”) (quoting United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 263 n.3 (1982) (Stevens, J., concurring
in judgment)). Contra Fulton v. City of Philadelphia, 141 S. Ct. 1868, 1907–15 (2021) (Alito, J., concurring in
judgment) (presenting a contrasting historical interpretation).
62. Braunfield v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599 (1961); Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944); Reynolds v.
United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1878).
63. See 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000bb (West 2021) (defining the purpose of the Religious Freedom Restoration
Act is, in part, “to restore the compelling interest test as set forth in Sherbert v. Verner and Wisconsin v. Yoder,
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In 1963, the Court held that Adell Sherbert, a member of the Seventh-day
Adventist Church, was entitled to unemployment compensation after losing her
job for refusing to work on Saturdays.64 A South Carolina law required claimants
to be “able to . . . and available for work,” but also provided that “no employee
shall be required to work on Sunday . . . who is conscientiously opposed to Sunday
work.”65 In the majority opinion, Justice William J. Brennan noted that the South
Carolina statute’s religious discrimination inherently favored the “Sunday
worshipper,” compounding the free exercise claim with an Establishment Clause
violation.66 The Court held the state had no compelling interest to justify forcing
Sherbert “to choose between following the precepts of her religion” and “accepting
work.”67
Several years later, the Court also used strict scrutiny to carve out an
exemption for religious objectors from a law punishing parents who refused to
send their children to school.68 The compulsory attendance law not only impinged
on the Amish people’s free exercise of religion but also “the liberty of parents and
guardians to direct the upbringing and education of children under their control.”69
The Court agreed with the state’s arguments that education is necessary for a
prepared, informed, self-reliant, and self-sufficient citizenry.70 However, Chief
Justice Warren Burger’s majority opinion emphasized that applying the
compulsory schooling law to the Amish did not serve these interests and praised
the law-abiding traits of Amish religious conduct.71
Ten years after Yoder, an Amish employer argued that paying social security
taxes also impinged on the free exercise of the Amish religion; the Court agreed
and applied strict scrutiny.72 However, despite this high standard of review, the
Court held that a religious belief against paying taxes did not create an exemption
from paying taxes.73 Congress created an exemption for the self-employed Amish;
but, as employers in the market, the Amish had to accept some limits on the
and to guarantee its application in all cases where free exercise of religion is substantially burdened”) (citations
omitted).
64. Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 399 (1963) (noting the claimant was unable to find other work).
65. Id. at 400–01, 406 (quoting the South Carolina Uncompensation Act).
66. See id. at 406 (holding preference for the “Sunday worshipper” infringed on Sabbatarians’ religious
liberty); id. at 409–10 (1963) (distinguishing the holding from establishing preference for Sabbatarians); see also
U.S. CONST. amend. I (“Congress shall make no law respecting the establishment of religion . . . .”).
67. Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 404.
68. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 234 (1972) (“[T]he First and Fourteenth Amendments prevent the
State from compelling respondents to cause their children to attend formal high school to age 16.”).
69. Id. at 232–33 (excusing the parents from paying the $10 fine).
70. Id. at 221 (noting that President Jefferson pointed out early in the nation’s history “that some degree
of education is necessary to prepare citizens to participate effectively and intelligently in our open political system
if we are to preserve freedom and independence”).
71. Id. at 222–24; see also CHEMERINSKY & GILLMAN, supra note 30, at 108 (arguing such analysis is “in
direct contradiction to the Constitution’s clear concern that there be no special religious favorites of the
government”).
72. United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 257 (1982).
73. Id. at 259–61.
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exercise of their religious beliefs.74 In his concurrence, Justice John Paul Stevens
stressed the risk that granting exemptions could “be perceived as favoring one
religion over another[, which] is an important risk the Establishment Clause was
designed to preclude.”75
B. The Advent of the Separationist Standard of Review
By the end of the 1980s, the Supreme Court was moving away from requiring
a compelling interest to uphold government action that burdened the free exercise
of religion.76 It upheld refusals to excuse prisoners from work to attend worship
and military uniform dress requirements that ban religious attire.77 Within those
governmental contexts, the Court chose approaches more deferential to the
government’s heightened interests.78 The Court went on to uphold a public project
that destroyed land sacred to Native Americans, even assuming the project would
“virtually destroy the . . . [tribes’] ability to practice their religion.”79 Justice
Sandra Day O’Connor wrote that whatever rights the tribes may have “do not
divest the Government of the right to use what is, after all, its land.”80
Justice Antonin Scalia expressly rejected the compelling interest requirement
for free exercise claims in Employment Division v. Smith.81 The Court upheld the
criminalization of peyote despite the incidental burden on religious groups who
use the substance in rituals.82 Smith stands for the separationist principle that
religious faith does not excuse believers from “valid and neutral law[s] of general
applicability.”83 In his controversial opinion for the majority, Justice Scalia found
that the “only decisions” in which the Court struck down “a neutral, generally
applicable law [as applied] to religiously motivated action” implicated additional
constitutional protections.84

74. See id. at 261 (“The tax imposed on employers to support the social security system must be uniformly
applicable to all, except as Congress provides explicitly otherwise.”).
75. Id. at 263 n.2 (Stevens, J., concurring in judgment) (writing separately because he felt the Court overemphasized the weight of the administrative burden on the state).
76. See Emp. Div., Dep’t of Human Res. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 879–84 (1990) (rejecting the need to
apply Sherbert); see also CHEMERINSKY & GILLMAN, supra note 30, at 110 (2020) (highlighting “the problems
associated with applying strict scrutiny to government action that incidentally burdens practitioners . . . and the
serious impact unchecked government action can have on the free exercise of religion”).
77. O’Lone v. Estate of Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342 (1987); Goldman v. Weinberger, 475 U.S. 503 (1986).
78. Shabazz, 482 U.S. at 350; Goldman, 475 U.S. at 507.
79. Lyng v. Nw. Indian Cemetery Protective Ass’n, 485 U.S. 439, 451–52 (1988).
80. Id. at 453.
81. Emp. Div., Dep’t of Human Res. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 884–89 (1990).
82. Id. at 890 (holding that Oregon could deny benefits for misconduct leading to dismissal because a
constitutionally permissible law prohibited the misconduct).
83. Id. at 879 (quoting United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 263 n.3 (1982) (Stevens, J., concurring in
judgment)).
84. Id. at 881.

215

2021 / Lost in the Minefield
A few years later in Lukumi, the Court invalidated a city ordinance that banned
the ritualized killing of animals as a violation of the Free Exercise Clause.85 Justice
Anthony Kennedy warned that the Court must investigate beyond the text of a
measure to determine its neutrality.86 The ordinances did not name the religion, but
the surrounding facts and the operation of the ordinances made their target clear.87
The city council adopted the measure soon after members of the Santeria
religion—an Afro-Cuban sect that employs animal sacrifice in its rituals—
announced they planned to construct a church in Hialeah, Florida.88 While
prohibiting animal sacrifice, the ordinance permitted all nonreligious slaughter of
animals and also provided an exemption for kosher slaughter.89 Finding the
ordinance targeted religious conduct, the Court applied strict scrutiny.90 Hialeah
argued it was pursuing the compelling government interests of public health and
preventing animal cruelty.91 Even so, the Court found the ordinances were both
overbroad and underinclusive because they failed to “prohibit nonreligious
conduct that endangers these interests” as much as Santeria’s practices did.92
More recently, in Masterpiece Cakeshop v. Colorado Civil Rights
Commission, the Court held the Commission violated the Free Exercise Clause
after a baker refused to sell a custom wedding cake to a same-sex couple.93 The
Court pointed out in dicta that religious objections “do not allow business owners
. . . to deny protected persons equal access to goods and services under a generally
applicable public accommodations law.”94 Justice Kennedy’s opinion for the
majority also noted that generally applicable laws may limit a business owner’s
exercise of religion.95 However, the Court found that the Commission displayed
impermissible hostility toward the baker’s religion in comments during an official
hearing on the matter.96
Unless a governing statute requires otherwise, Smith and Lukumi continue to
control cases in which the government takes action that burdens religious
conduct.97 A “ministerial exception” provides further exemptions to antidiscrimination laws regarding religious organizations’ employing workers with
85. Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 524 (1993).
86. Id. at 534.
87. Id. at 534–38.
88. Id. at 525–28.
89. Id. at 535–36 (1993).
90. Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, 508 U.S. at 546.
91. Id. at 543.
92. Id. at 543, 546–47 (“The proffered objectives are not pursued with respect to analogous non-religious
conduct, and those interests could be achieved by narrower ordinances that burdened religion to a far lesser
degree.”).
93. 138 S. Ct. 1719, 1732 (2018).
94. Id. at 1727.
95. Id. at 1723–24.
96. Id. at 1729–30.
97. See Fulton v. City of Philadelphia, 141 S. Ct. 1868 (2021) (avoiding the option to “revisit” Smith,
leaving the doctrine in place).
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ministerial duties.98 A patchwork of statutes also exists that limit Smith and
Lukumi’s applicability elsewhere.99
C. Statutory Strict Scrutiny in Response to Smith
Congress passed the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (“RFRA”) to
explicitly “restore the compelling interest test as set forth” in Sherbert and Yoder
that Smith and Lukumi rejected.100 Subsection 1 discusses the federal RFRA and
Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc.101 Subsection 2 tracks the development of
state RFRAs across the nation.102 Subsection 3 reviews how the court of appeals
interpreted Pennsylvania’s version of the statute when considering Fulton.103
1. Religious Freedom Restoration Act
The federal RFRA sought to “guarantee its application” in all cases in which
the government substantially burdens the free exercise of religion, not just in which
the government targets religion.104 Under the statute, government action will only
survive strict scrutiny if it is “in furtherance of a compelling government interest”
and “is the least restrictive means of furthering” that interest.105 But a few years
after Congress enacted RFRA, the Supreme Court held the federal statute
unconstitutional as applied to state governments.106 The Court found that Congress
exceeded the Fourteenth Amendment’s power when it attempted to make a
substantive change to First Amendment protections.107 However, the statute still
applies to federal governmental action.108

98. See generally Our Lady of Guadalupe Sch. v. Morrissey-Berru, 140 S. Ct. 2049 (2020) (holding that
the “ministerial exception” barred teachers’ employment discrimination claims).
99. Infra Section III.C.
100. 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000bb(b)(1) (West 2021); see also supra Section III.A (reviewing Sherbert and
Yoder).
101. Infra Subsection III.C.1.
102. Infra Subsection III.C.2.
103. Infra Subsection III.C.3.
104. 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000bb(b)(1) (West 2021).
105. 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000bb-1 (West 2021).
106. City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 511–12 (1997) (upholding a city ordinance requiring approval
from a city commission before construction in a historic district despite the commission’s denial of a permit to a
religious group seeking to expand its church within a historic district); see also MARCI A. HAMILTON, GOD VS.
THE GAVEL: THE PERILS OF EXTREME RELIGIOUS LIBERTY 274–77 (2d rev. ed. 2014) (discussing the author’s
victory representing the city as attorney in Boerne).
107. Flores, 521 U.S. at 536 (“When the political branches of the Government act against the background
of a judicial interpretation of the Constitution already issued, it must be understood that in later cases and
controversies the Court will treat its precedents with the respect due them under settled principles, including stare
decisis, and contrary expectations must be disappointed.”).
108. Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 573 U.S. 682, 694–96 (2014).
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Burwell expanded the free exercise doctrine by granting religious exemptions
to employers of “for-profit closely held corporations” in secular contexts.109 The
Affordable Care Act requires employers with 50 or more employees to offer health
insurance with “minimum essential coverage.”110 The United States Department of
Health and Human Services promulgated regulations interpreting this requirement
to include contraception coverage.111 The Court in Burwell held that forcing an
employer to directly or indirectly fund conduct that violates the employer’s
religious beliefs is a substantial burden to the employer’s religion.112 The
regulations also failed the “least restrictive means” test because the government
could theoretically provide free contraception to any woman whose employer
denies it due to religious exemptions.113 Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg feared the
Court entered a “minefield” by applying strict scrutiny to free exercise claims from
employers engaging in secular business.114 She ended her dissent to Burwell by
stressing the importance of the constitutional tradition of “keeping the courts ‘out
of the business of evaluating the relative merits of differing religious claims.’”115
2. State RFRAs
Many states enacted their own versions of the federal RFRA or amended their
constitution to require strict scrutiny, which aggressively expanded religious
liberty protections nationwide.116 The overwhelming majority of state RFRAs, like
the federal one, apply only to government action.117 In those states, RFRAs do not
protect religious objectors in lawsuits where the government is not a party.118
Conservative religious lobbyists campaigned to expand state RFRAs to allow
private businesses and individuals to “refuse to do business with anyone they
chose, based on religious belief.”119

109. 573 U.S. 682 (2014).
110. Id. at 696 (citing 26 U.S.C. § 5000A(f)(2)).
111. Id. at 694–96.
112. Id. at 726 (“Because the contraceptive mandate forces them to pay an enormous sum of money—as
much as $475 million per year in the case of Hobby Lobby—if they insist on providing insurance coverage in
accordance with their religious beliefs, the mandate clearly imposes a substantial burden on those beliefs.”).
113. Id. at 728.
114. Burwell, 573 U.S. at 771–72 (2014) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (citing Spencer v. World Vision, Inc.,
633 F.3d 723, 730 (9th Cir. 2010) (O’Scannlain, J., concurring in judgment)).
115. Id. at 771 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (quoting United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 263 n.2 (Stevens, J.,
concurring in judgment)); see also Section V.C (elaborating on the minefield).
116. CHEMERINSKY & GILLMAN, supra note 30, at 118; HAMILTON, supra note 106, at 231–32.
117. See HAMILTON, supra note 106, at 231 (comparing the impact of state RFRAs to the Jim Crow era in
the South); Joshua Sato, Indiana’s Religious Freedom Restoration Act Sparks Controversy, AM. BAR ASS’N,
https://www.americanbar.org/groups/litigation/committees/minority-trial-lawyer/practice/2015/indianas-religiou
s-freedom-restoration-act-sparks-controversy/ (on file with the University of the Pacific Law Review).
118. See Elane Photography, LLC v. Willock, 309 P.3d 53, 76–77 (2013) (finding that a civil court could
enforce the New Mexico Human Rights Act without violating the New Mexico RFRA because the latter was
“inapplicable to disputes in which a government agency is not a party”).
119. HAMILTON, supra note 106, at 231 (pointing to “perilous bills” in Maine, Kansas, South Dakota,
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In 2015, Indiana’s General Assembly passed a bill that imposed strict scrutiny
in cases involving only private litigants.120 Arizona and Arkansas legislatures had
passed similarly broad RFRAs in recent years, but their governors refused to sign
the bills.121 These measures faced a “surge of opposition” from large corporations
and sports leagues, sparking concerns about the economic impact of governmentsupported discrimination.122 But Governor Mike Pence signed the broadly worded
Indiana RFRA into law.123 Civic and industry advocates—both locally and
nationally—responded fiercely and swiftly by canceling conventions, threatening
boycotts, and demanding a fix to the problematic statute.124 Lawmakers worked
quickly with business leaders to pass an amendment declaring that Indiana’s RFRA
did not create a license to discriminate.125 Some advocates argued these changes
were “insufficient,” while opposing religious objectors declared the changes would
“destroy religious freedom in Indiana.”126
Other state RFRAs are more moderate, do not impose strict scrutiny, and are
even the product of both combined religious liberty and anti-discrimination
advocacy.127 Ultimately, when the government is a party to an action, strict scrutiny
is the standard of review in cases where the federal and many state RFRAs
control.128 Otherwise, unless a similar statute governs, the First Amendment still
allows federal and state governments to make general laws of neutral applicability
Ohio, and Idaho).
120. S.B. 101, 119th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ind. 2015).
121. S.B. 1062, 51st Leg., 2d Reg. Sess. (Ariz. 2014); H.B. 1228, 90th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ark.
2015); HAMILTON, supra note 106, at 231–32; Catherine E. Shoichet & Halimah Abdullah, Arizona Gov. Jan
Brewer
Vetoes
Controversial
Anti-Gay
Bill,
SB
1062,
CNN
(Feb.
26,
2014),
https://www.cnn.com/2014/02/26/politics/arizona-brewer-bill/index.html (on file with the University of the
Pacific Law Review) (quoting Governor Brewer: “Religious liberty is a core American and Arizona value. So is
non-discrimination.”); see also Garrett Epps, The Next Steps in the Battle over Religious-Freedom Laws,
ATLANTIC (Apr. 2, 2015), https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2015/04/the-next-steps-in-the-battleover-religious-freedom-laws/389369/ (on file with the University of the Pacific Law Review) (comparing the
Indiana statute to one in Arkansas).
122. Shoichet & Abdullah, supra note 121.
123. Garrett Epps, What Makes Indiana’s Religious-Freedom Law Different?, ATLANTIC (Mar. 30, 2015),
https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2015/03/what-makes-indianas-religious-freedom-lawdifferent/388997/ (on file with the University of the Pacific Law Review).
124. Tony Cook, Tom LoBlanco & Brian Eason, Gov. Mike Pence Signs RFRA Fix, INDYSTAR (Apr. 1,
2015), https://www.indystar.com/story/news/politics/2015/04/01/indiana-rfra-deal-sets-limited-protections-forlgbt/70766920/ (on file with the University of the Pacific Law Review).
125. S.B. 50, 119th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ind. 2015); Cook, LoBlanco & Eason, supra note 124.
126. Robert King, Backers of ‘Religious Freedom’ Bill Call for Pence Veto, INDYSTAR (Apr. 2, 2015),
https://www.indystar.com/story/news/2015/04/02/christian-lobbyist-rfra-fix-destroy-bill/70823194/ (on file with
the University of the Pacific Law Review); Jeff Swiatek, Angie’s List Rejects ‘Religious Freedom’ Law Revision,
Calls It ‘Insufficient’, INDYSTAR (Apr. 2, 2015), https://www.indystar.com/story/money/2015/04/02/angies-listrejects-religious-freedom-law-fix-calls-insufficient/70824960/ (on file with the University of the Pacific Law
Review).
127. See WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE & CHRISTOPHER R. RIANO, MARRIAGE EQUALITY loc. 13940–14009
(Kindle ed. 2020) (proposing that Utah’s Anti-Discrimination and Religious Freedom Amendments Act of 2015’s
“approach of adding specific exemptions, after legislative deliberation, strikes us as a productive strategy for
protecting religious freedom”).
128. Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 573 U.S. 682, 694–96 (2014).
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that have incidental burdens on religion.129 Without the record showing the
government treated religion less favorably than comparable secular conduct, a
court will use a rational basis standard for review.130
3. RFPA
Pennsylvania’s Religious Freedom Protection Act (“RFPA”) is not like
Indiana’s RFRA, despite efforts to introduce similar measures during an election
in 2014.131 RFPA requires strict scrutiny in cases in which governments
“substantially burden” religion.132 Under RFPA, a government substantially
burdens religion if it:
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)

Significantly constrains or inhibits conduct or expression mandated by
a person’s sincerely held religious beliefs.
Significantly curtails a person’s ability to express adherence to the
person’s religious faith.
Denies a person a reasonable opportunity to engage in activities which
are fundamental to the person’s religion.
Compels conduct or expression which violates a specific tenet of a
person’s religious faith.133

When the facts of Fulton reached the court of appeals in the Third District, the
court found it unlikely that CSS experienced a substantial burden under
Pennsylvania case law.134 Courts there consider conduct “fundamental to the
person’s religion” if it is an “inherently religious activity,” but noted secular groups
also engage in foster care.135 The statute’s guidelines for evaluating what is
“fundamental to the person’s religion” led the court to determine that the burden
was not “substantial” under Pennsylvania law.136 When reviewing the court of
appeals decision, none of the opinions that the Justices issued chose to analyze
Fulton under RFPA.137

129. Fulton v. City of Philadelphia, 141 S. Ct. 1868, 1876–77 (2021) (refraining from reconsidering Emp.
Div., Dep’t of Human Res. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990)).
130. Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 531 (1993).
131. Christian Alexandersen, Pennsylvania Has a Religious Freedom Law Too, but Not Like Indiana’s,
PATRIOT-NEWS (Apr. 1, 2015), https://www.pennlive.com/midstate/2015/04/pennsylvania_has_a_religious_
f.html (on file with the University of the Pacific Law Review).
132. 71 PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN. § 2404 (West 2021).
133. § 2403.
134. Fulton v. City of Philadelphia, 922 F.3d 140, 162–65 (2019).
135. Id. at 163.
136. Id. at 162–65.
137. 141 S. Ct. 1868 (2021).
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IV. ATTRITION: THE FREE EXERCISE CLAIM IN FULTON
Fulton was likely a “poor vehicle” to reconsider Smith because the City was
not regulating activity broadly but rather participating in the “market” of foster
services.138 The City argued that the foster care agency’s practices ran afoul of the
Fair Practices Ordinance, which prohibited discrimination in public
accommodations.139 However, the Court found that the ordinance did not apply
because foster-parent certification was not a public accommodation due to the
“uniquely selective nature of the certification process.”140
A majority of the Court found that the facts of Fulton triggered strict scrutiny
consistent with Smith, thereby avoiding the question of overruling Smith.141
Section A distinguishes Smith’s requirements of neutrality and general
applicability.142 Section B reviews how the majority applied strict scrutiny.143
Section C summarizes the concurrences that Justices issued.144
A. Neutrality and General Applicability
While the Court considered Fulton, several free exercise challenges to
California’s COVID-19 restrictions made their way to the Court.145 These “shadow
docket” cases shed light on the Court’s standards for neutrality and general
applicability.146 In Tandon v. Newsom, the Court granted an injunction to religious
claimants against California restrictions that temporarily prohibited indoor
gatherings but contained “myriad exceptions” for secular contexts.147 In a per
curiam opinion, the Court stated that “government regulations are not neutral and
138. See Clare Kindall, Symposium: The First Amendment Does Not Require Governments to Contract
with Parties Who Do Not Comply with Neutral, Generally Applicable Rules, SCOTUSBLOG (Oct. 29, 2020, 12:50
PM), https://www.scotusblog.com/2020/10/symposium-the-first-amendment-does-not-require-governments-tocontract-with-parties-who-do-not-comply-with-neutral-generally-applicable-rules/ (on file with the University of
the Pacific Law Review) (“Because this case concerns a religious organization trying to impose its religious beliefs
upon government action at government cost, the review of the government’s requirements should be rational
basis, rather than strict scrutiny, and the lower courts’ decisions should be affirmed.”).
139. Fulton, 141 S. Ct. at 1879–81.
140. Id. But see id. at 1927 (Gorsuch, J., concurring in judgment) (questioning the majority’s choice to rely
on Pennsylvania’s public accommodation law instead of the Fair Practices Ordinance or the finding of the district
court).
141. Id. at 1881.
142. Infra Section IV.A.
143. Infra Section IV.B.
144. Infra Section IV.C.
145. See Tandon v. Newsom, 141 S. Ct. 1294, 1297 (2021) (“This is the fifth time the Court has summarily
rejected the Ninth Circuit’s analysis of California’s COVID restrictions on religious exercise.”).
146. Id.; see also James Romoser, Symposium: Shining a Light on the Shadow Docket, SCOTUSBLOG
(Oct. 22, 2020 12:15 PM), https://www.scotusblog.com/2020/10/symposium-shining-a-light-on-the-shadowdocket/ (on file with the University of the Pacific Law Review) (defining “shadow docket” as “the body of orders
issued by the Supreme Court outside the formal opinions in the 70 or so cases in which it hears oral argument
each term”).
147. 141 S. Ct. 1294, 1298 (2021).
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generally applicable . . . whenever they treat any comparable secular activity more
favorably than religious exercise.”148 Courts must decide whether two activities are
comparable “against the asserted government interest that justifies the regulation
at issue.”149
Leading scholar Douglas Laycock argues that “[i]f a law with even a few
secular exceptions isn’t neutral and generally applicable, then not many laws
are.”150 Politicians regularly use exceptions to “grease the wheels” for legislation,
creating exemptions for friends, contributors, and interest groups.151 However,
Fulton clarifies the distinction between neutrality and general applicability for
determining whether government action satisfies both requirements.152
The majority opinion declares that government action is not neutral when it
“proceeds in a manner intolerant of religious beliefs” or restricts conduct due to its
religious nature.153 CSS pointed to some city officials’ comments that CSS’s policy
was “discrimination that occurs under the guise of religious freedom,” “out of
date,” and “out of touch with Pope Francis’s teaching” as “disparaging” remarks
that could evince impermissible targeting.154 However, the Chief Justice avoided
analyzing the City’s conduct under this rule directly, preferring to skip to the more
“straightforward” analysis of general applicability.155
Government action is not generally applicable if it prohibits religious conduct
while permitting secular conduct that similarly undermines the government’s
claimed interests.156 A law that provides a “mechanism for individualized
exemptions” will fail the general applicability test because it “invite[s]” the
government to review the motivation for a person’s conduct.157 The Court in Fulton
found that the provision prohibiting CSS from rejecting a couple for their sexual
orientation also allowed exemptions at the commissioner’s “sole discretion.”158
Because the Commissioner had “no intention” of extending this “exemption
system” to this case of “religious hardship,” the City’s action was not generally
applicable.159 The City countered that the Commissioner had never granted any
148. Id. at 1296.
149. Id.
150. Douglas Laycock, The Broader Implications of Masterpiece Cakeshop, 2019 BYU L. Rev. 167, 173.
151. Id.; see also Jim Oleske, Tandon Steals Fulton’s Thunder: the Most Important Free Exercise Decision
Since 1990, SCOTUSblog (Apr. 15, 2021, 10:13 AM), https://www.scotusblog.com/2021/04/tandon-stealsfultons-thunder-the-most-important-free-exercise-decision-since-1990/ (on file with the University of the Pacific
Law Review) (arguing Tandon adopts a “most favored nation” theory of religious exemptions and settled major
free exercise questions prior to Fulton).
152. Fulton, 141 S. Ct. at 1877.
153. Id.
154. Id.; id. at 1919–21 (Alito, J., concurring in judgment).
155. Id.
156. Id.; see also Tandon v. Newsom, 141 S. Ct. 1294, 1296 (2021) (defining neutrality and general
applicability).
157. Fulton, 141 S. Ct. at 1877 (quoting Emp. Div., Dep’t of Human Res. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 884
(1990)).
158. Id. at 1878.
159. Id.
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exceptions.160 However, the Court emphasized that the mechanism for exceptions,
not the factual exceptions themselves, rendered the government’s policy not
generally applicable.161
B. Strict Scrutiny
By failing to meet the general applicability requirement, the City’s policy
triggered strict scrutiny.162 To survive strict scrutiny, the City needed to show an
interest “of the highest order” and that it narrowly tailored its pursuit toward
achieving those interests.163 The City asserted three interests in enforcing its antidiscrimination policies: “maximizing the number of foster parents, protecting the
City from liability, and ensuring equal treatment of prospective foster parents and
foster children.”164
The majority opinion specified that the question was whether the City denying
CSS a religious accommodation supported these interests, not whether the interests
were broadly compelling.165 The Court negated the applicability of the first interest
because the Court assumed that CSS’s participation in the system would likely
increase the number of foster parents.166 The Court also quickly dismissed the
interest in limiting exposure to liability as speculative because the City did not
delegate certification authority to CSS; the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania did.167
The Chief Justice paused, however, when evaluating the City’s interest in
equal treatment among potential foster parents and children.168 The Court
acknowledged this interest was a “weighty one,” but found denying an
accommodation to CSS while making a “system of exceptions” available to the
Commissioner unjustifiable.169 Finding the City’s actions could not survive strict
scrutiny, the Court reversed and remanded the case for further proceedings.170
C. Concurrences
Three justices wrote concurring opinions.171 Justice Amy Coney Barrett—who
joined the majority opinion in full—favored arguments against Smith but agreed
160. Id. at 1879.
161. Id.
162. Fulton, 141 S. Ct. at 1881.
163. Id.
164. Id.
165. Id.
166. Id. But see infra Subsection V.D.1 (arguing that discriminatory practices exclude a vital source of
potentially qualified foster parents).
167. Fulton, 141 S. Ct. at 1882.
168. Id.
169. Id.
170. Id.
171. Id. (Barrett, J., concurring in judgment); id. at 883 (Alito, J. concurring in judgment); id. at 1926
(Gorsuch, J. concurring in judgment).
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that overruling Smith was unnecessary under the facts of Fulton.172 Justice Barrett
(joined by Justices Kavanaugh and Breyer) went on to question what could replace
Smith;173 Justice Neil Gorsuch responded that “the Court should overrule [Smith]
now, set us back on the correct course, and address each case as it comes.”174 His
opinion (joined by Justices Samuel Alito and Clarence Thomas) reminded the
Court about the cost that the culture wars toll—not only on the judiciary and
litigants, but also on individuals uncertain about what their religious liberty
guarantees.175
Justice Alito “swung for the fences” in a seventy-seven-page opinion that
called for direct confrontation with Smith.176 The opinion (also joined by Justices
Gorsuch and Thomas) presented a historical narrative arguing that Smith—not
private rights to exemptions—is the constitutional anomaly.177 He lambasted the
majority opinion as “written on the dissolving paper sold in magic shops” because
the City could navigate around the decision by “simply eliminat[ing] the neverused exemption power.”178 Justice Alito ultimately claimed he could find “[n]o
relevant factor” weighing against overruling Smith.179 Despite Justice Alito’s
impassioned argument, a majority of the Court endorsed an approach that avoided
overruling Smith, leaving the controversial doctrine in place.180
V. ENGAGEMENT: FULTON’S MISSING DISSENT
Finding a unanimous decision on narrow grounds denied religious liberty
advocates the broad triumph they envisioned, but anti-discrimination advocates
were also denied a dissent to religious liberty’s limited victory.181 Section A
analyzes the facts of Fulton under Smith’s rational basis.182 Section B articulates
why the Court was wise to uphold judicial norms like avoidance and stare decisis
that weigh against overruling Smith.183 Section C argues that judges should avoid
172. Fulton, 141 S. Ct. at 1882 (2021) (Barrett, J., concurring in judgment).
173. Id. at 1882–83 (Barrett, J., concurring in judgment).
174. Id. at 1931 (Gorsuch, J., concurring in judgment).
175. Id. at 1929–31 (Gorsuch, J., concurring in judgment).
176. Ariane de Vogue, Justice Samuel Alito Swung for the Fences on Religious Liberty and Came Up
Short, CNN (June 18, 2021, 7:03 AM), https://www.cnn.com/2021/06/18/politics/alito-religious-liberty-smithfulton/index.html (on file with the University of the Pacific Law Review).
177. Fulton, 141 S. Ct. at 1907–15 (Alito, J., concurring in judgment).
178. Id. at 1887 (Alito, J., concurring in judgment).
179. Id. at 1912 (Alito, J., concurring in judgment) (using factors from Janus v. State, Cnty., and Mun.
Employees, 138 S. Ct. 2448 (2018)).
180. See id. at 1881 (finding “no occasion to reconsider” Smith).
181. See Quin Hillyer, Conservatives Still Seem to Never Get Big Court Wins, WASH. EXAM’R (June 17,
2021),
https://www.washingtonexaminer.com/opinion/columnists/conservatives-still-seem-never-to-get-bigcourt-wins (on file with the University of the Pacific Law Review) (describing the Chief Justice as running a
“‘Let’s Make a Deal’ regime” where “very little . . . ever seems final[,] invit[ing] endless rounds of judicial hairsplitting”).
182. Infra Section V.A.
183. Infra Section V.B.
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strict scrutiny in free exercise claims because it draws them into the “minefield”
Justice Ginsburg warned against in her dissent to Burwell.184 Section D reluctantly
forges ahead into the minefield and finds that the compelling interest of fighting
LGBT discrimination justifies the incidental burden on some people within the
Catholic faith.185
A. Rational Basis Review
Unless a statute like RFRA governs, the government may create neutral and
generally applicable laws that have an incidental effect on religious conduct.186
The Fulton majority opinion defined neutrality—by identifying when it is absent—
but then declined to analyze the facts under its rule.187 While CSS made
accusations that “spite” motivated the City’s actions, a review of the record would
not likely reveal sufficient hostility to negate the City’s actions.188 The claimants
“broadly implied” that the City’s true object was to “force the Philadelphia
Archdiocese to change its position on marriage.”189 Yet the City merely asked CSS
to comply with the terms of its contract—terms present in the City’s standard foster
care contracts.190 Furthermore, the City still worked with CSS in other major
financial engagements after this dispute started, which weighs heavily against
finding impermissible hostility in the City’s conduct toward CSS.191
The Court reviewed Fulton under strict scrutiny because it found the City’s
contract provisions were not generally applicable due to exemptions provided at a
commissioner’s “sole discretion.”192 However, the City disputes this interpretation
of the contract.193 The City contended that the provisions granting the
Commissioner exemptions applied only to referrals not screening, pointing to the
section’s title: “Rejection of Referral.”194 The City further argued referring
children to foster homes is not comparable to screening potential foster parents
because they occur at different times and involve different governmental
184. Infra Section V.C.
185. Infra Section V.D.
186. See Fulton v. City of Philadelphia, 141 S. Ct. 1868, 1881 (2021) (leaving the Smith rule in place).
187. Supra Subsection IV.A.1.
188. Transcript of Oral Argument at 56, Fulton, 140 S. Ct. 1104 (2020); see also Fulton v. City of
Philadelphia, 922 F.3d 140, 157 (2019), rev’d by 141 S. Ct. 1868 (2021) (“The evidence CSS offers of religious
bias or hostility appears significantly less than what was present in Lukumi or even in Masterpiece.”).
189. Fulton, 141 S. Ct. at 1888 (Alito, J., concurring in judgment).
190. Fulton, 922 F.3d 140, 148–51 (2019), rev’d by 141 S. Ct. 1868 (noting that the article prompted the
Philadelphia City Council to adopt a resolution stating that the City’s laws “protect its people from discrimination
that occurs under the guise of religious freedom” and any “agency which violates City contract rules in addition
to the Fair Practices Ordinance should have their contract with the City terminated with all deliberate speed”);
Terruso, supra note 13.
191. Transcript of Oral Argument at 66, Fulton, 140 S. Ct. 1104 (2020) (noting that the City continues to
contract with CSS for tens of millions of dollars for other services).
192. Fulton, 141 S. Ct. at 1878–79 (2021).
193. Id. at 1879.
194. Id.
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interests.195 However, the majority opinion found that references within the text to
“Services” were not limited to referrals.196 Despite the Justices Alito and Gorsuch
more or less adopting CSS’s interpretation of the contract, the Court held that the
title did not “override the plain words of [the] text.”197 Arriving at such an
important decision by “ask[ing] us to ignore” the title of the section did little to
calm concerns that the Court was merely avoiding the main conflict.198 But perhaps
that is precisely what the majority was trying to do.199
B. Judicial Norms: Precedence & Avoidance
The Court should avoid creating rules of law broader than necessary for the
given facts.200 The Court avoided reconsidering Smith because it found the City’s
actions triggered strict scrutiny consistent with Smith.201 But confrontation
between religious liberty and anti-discrimination efforts may be inevitable.202 Days
after issuing the ruling in Fulton, the Court denied petitions to two other cases that
would challenge Smith’s efficacy.203
The doctrine of stare decisis calls on courts to follow precedent “when the
same points arise again in litigation.”204 The Constitution demands “continuity
over time” so strongly that “a respect for precedent is, by definition,
indispensable.”205 However, adhering to this doctrine absolutely could lead to
grave injustice when used to uphold bad law.206 In her majority opinion in Planned
Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, Justice O’Connor outlined the
factors courts must consider when reconsidering prior holdings.207 Courts must
consider whether the rule has become unworkable, potential inequity from people

195. Transcript of Oral Argument at 105, Fulton, 140 S. Ct. 1104 (2020).
196. Fulton, 141 S. Ct. at 1878–79.
197. Id. at 1879 (2021) (quoting Justice Scalia’s “Title-and-Headings Canon”).
198. See generally id. at 1929 (Gorsuch, J., concurring in judgment) (2021) (noting the majority “asks us
to ignore the usual rule that a more specific contractual provision can comfortably coexist with a more general
one”).
199. See Section V.B (discussing the judicial tradition of avoidance); see also Fulton, 141 S. Ct. at 1931
(Gorsuch, J., concurring in judgment) (positing that the majority was avoiding “picking a side”).
200. Ashwander v. Tenn. Valley Auth., 297 U.S. 288, 347 (1936) (Brandeis, J., concurring in judgment).
201. Fulton, 141 S. Ct. at 1877.
202. Hoffman, supra note 8; see also Gillman & Chemerinsky, supra note 21 (recounting the recent series
of challenges to free exercise jurisprudence).
203. Arlene’s Flowers, Inc. v. Washington, 2019 WL 4413355 (claiming that enforcing anti-discrimination
laws requiring her create custom floral art for same-sex weddings violates her free exercise and free speech
rights); Ricks v. State of Idaho Contractors Bd., 2019 WL 3075985 (asking the court to again revisit Smith).
204. Stare Decisis, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed., 2019).
205. Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 854 (1992) (citing
BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 149 (1921)).
206. Stare Decisis, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed., 2019) (defining super stare decisis and pointing
to the repudiation of Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896), in Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 484 (1954)).
207. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 854–55 (1992) (upholding the essential holding in Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113
(1973)).
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relying on the rule, whether the rule is a remnant of an abandoned doctrine, and if
facts changed sufficiently to negate the rule’s application.208
Smith not only provides a workable, bright-line rule in rational basis, but the
accommodationist alternative of strict scrutiny is unworkable.209 Applying rational
basis to neutral and generally applicable laws avoids evaluating religious belief.210
Religious exemptions from neutral and generally applicable laws, on the other
hand, protect discriminatory practices and will, therefore, increase inequity for
protected classes.211 While RFRAs have eroded Smith’s application in many cases,
the swift public outcry over legislatures expanding RFRAs demonstrates the
vitality of the values underlying Smith in the eyes of the public.212 The decades
since Smith also teach us that religious exemptions funding discriminatory policies
do not serve the best interests of children because research “overwhelmingly
conclude[s] that sexual orientation has no bearing on an individual’s ability to be
a fit parent.”213
To the contrary, Justice Alito could find no factor that weighed against
overruling Smith.214 Justice Alito found Smith’s reasoning flawed and its doctrine
unworkable due to confusion over the applicability of each of its requirements.215
He went on to argue that the decades since Smith showed that courts can apply a
compelling interest without inviting the “anarchy” that Smith warned of.216
However, Smith warns that triggering strict scrutiny for any burden on religious
conduct invites anarchy while Justice Alito calls for strict scrutiny for substantial
burdens.217 Justice Scalia’s criticism of limiting strict scrutiny to substantial
burdens is that it requires judges to determine what is “important” or “central” to
a person’s religion, not that it invites anarchy.218 This too weighs heavily in favor
of adhering to precedent and against overruling Smith.219 The Court’s decision in
Tandon and now Fulton refined Smith’s requirements of neutrality and general
applicability, diminishing Justice Alito’s concerns regarding their clarity.220
Adherence to precedence strengthens the judiciary, but reconsidering Smith would

208. Casey, 505 U.S. at 854–55.
209. See infra Section V.C (noting the problems with strict scrutiny and the inconsistent results of
accommodation).
210. See id. (defining and arguing against entering the Justice Ginsburg’s metaphorical minefield).
211. See generally AM. BAR ASS’N, HOUSE OF DELEGATES RESOLUTION 113 at 4–6 (Jan. 28, 2019) (noting
the disproportionate harm that laws supporting discrimination impose on potential same-sex parents).
212. See supra Section III.C (recounting the origins and response to federal and state RFRAs).
213. AM. BAR ASS’N, HOUSE OF DELEGATES RESOLUTION 113 at 14 (Jan. 28, 2019).
214. Fulton v. City of Philadelphia, 141 S. Ct. 1868, 1923 (2021) (Alito, J., concurring in judgment).
215. Id. at 1912–24 (Alito, J., concurring in judgment).
216. Id. at 1922 (Alito, J., concurring in judgment).
217. Compare id. at 1888, 1893, 1922, 1924 (Alito, J., concurring in judgment), with Emp. Div., Dep’t of
Human Res. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 888 (1990).
218. Smith, 494 U.S. at 886–87 (responding to Justice Brennan’s dissent in Lyng v. Northwest Indian
Cemetery Protective Ass’n, 485 U.S. 439, 474–76 (1988)).
219. See infra Subsection V.C.1 (arguing that strict scrutiny invokes this unacceptable evaluation).
220. See supra Section V.A (reviewing these requirements).
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only embolden religious objectors to continue challenging precedents they
disagree with under any plausible set of facts.221
C. Strict Scrutiny Evaluates Religious Beliefs
After finding that the contract provisions were not generally applicable, the
Court required the City to show an interest “of the highest order” and that it
narrowly tailored its actions to achieving those interests.222 Subsection 1 identifies
how strict scrutiny necessitates evaluation of religious beliefs, which judges should
avoid.223 Subsection 2 examines how uneven application in this minefield
demonstrates the unworkability of accommodationist interpretation of the Free
Exercise Clause.224
1. Navigating the Minefield
To survive a free exercise claim under most definitions of strict scrutiny, the
government must justify substantial burdens on religion by using the least
restrictive means to achieve a compelling interest.225 Strict scrutiny’s compelling
interest requirement for incidental burdens in free exercise claims creates an
anomaly in constitutional law: a private right to ignore neutral laws of general
applicability.226 When the law grants exemptions to a religion, it shows preference,
which violates the Establishment Clause.227
Yoder serves as a foundation for the accommodationist standard of strict
scrutiny.228 There, Chief Justice Burger argued that applying the compulsory
schooling law did not serve governmental interests because a highly regulated life
aloof from worldly influence was “central” to the law-abiding Amish people.229 In

221. See Gillman & Chemerinsky, supra note 21 (“If they [overrule Smith], the Supreme Court’s
conservative majority will in essence be saying that the views of Christian conservatives are more important than
legal protections for workers and people who seek to engage in ordinary commercial activity without suffering
discrimination.”). See generally Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (holding that plausibility “is not akin
to a ‘probability requirement,’ but it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully”).
222. Fulton v. City of Philadelphia, 141 S. Ct. 1868, 1881 (2021).
223. Infra Section V.A.
224. Infra Section V.B.
225. See generally 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000bb-1(b)(1) (West 2021) (articulating the accommodationist standard
of strict scrutiny for free exercise claims).
226. City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 513 (1997); Emp. Div., Dep’t of Human Res. v. Smith, 494
U.S. 872, 885–86 (1990); see also supra Part III (reviewing the battle for standards of review in free exercise
jurisprudence).
227. See United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 263 n.2 (1982) (Stevens, J., concurring in judgment) (“The
risk that governmental approval of some and disapproval of others will be perceived as favoring one religion over
another is an important risk the Establishment Clause was designed to preclude.”).
228. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb(b)(1) (West 2021) (declaring its purpose in restoring the rule from Sherbert
and Yoder).
229. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 210–13, 222–24 (1972) (discussing the “central religious
concepts” that motivate the “Amish objection to formal education beyond the eighth grade”).
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his partial dissent to Yoder, Justice William O. Douglas argued that the “law and
order” nature of the group is and should be irrelevant.230 Justice Douglas stated,
“[a] religion is a religion irrespective of what the misdemeanor or felony records
of its members might be.”231 The Court’s analysis in Yoder begs the question: What
would the outcome have been if the Santeria religion in Lukumi had been first to
challenge a compulsory schooling law?232
Decisions like Fulton show preference for the Catholic religion because now
the City must treat CSS equally to other foster care agencies, despite CSS’s facially
inferior services.233 The City has the authority to determine the terms of its own
contracts, including anti-discrimination provisions, and this authority does not
impede the liberty interests of CSS.234 Foster care is a government function, not an
exclusively liturgical function.235 The Constitution does not entitle a person to
receive government contracts, nor to serve as a foster-parent facilitator; nor should
a person’s religious beliefs create such entitlements.236 Providing religious
exemptions requires a government to treat facially inferior bids for contracts
equally to bids that fully conform with the contract’s terms.237 This is inherently
unfair to secular market participants and shows preference for religion, which
violates the Establishment Clause.238
Exemptions show preference for religion, but strict scrutiny’s evaluation of
religious beliefs does not always yield positive results for free exercise
claimants.239 The Third District held in Fulton that CSS did not experience a
substantial burden under RFPA because foster care is not an “intrinsically religious
activity.”240 RFPA called for the court of appeals to evaluate the sincerity of CSS’s
faith, what is fundamental to the faith, whether adherence to the faith mandated the
restricted conduct, and whether the City’s actions “significantly” constrained
them.241 These questions are not the work of judges because they are “akin to the
230. 406 U.S. at 246 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
231. Id.
232. Cf. 508 U.S. 520, 524–25 (1993) (discussing the beliefs and persecution of the Santeria sect).
233. Brief of Government Contracts Professor and Practitioner Richard C. Loeb as Amicus Curiae in
Support of Respondents at 22–23, 141 S. Ct. 1868 (2021) (No. 19-123).
234. See id. at 6–9 (describing the authority as “well-established” and “long recognized”).
235. Kindall, supra note 138 (citing Schall v. Martin, 467 U.S. 253 (1984)).
236. Id.
237. Brief of Government Contracts Professor and Practitioner Richard C. Loeb as Amicus Curiae in
Support of Respondents at 22–23, Fulton, 141 S. Ct. 1868 (2021) (No. 19-123).
238. See id. (arguing religious exemptions would undermine government efficiency); see also United
States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 263 n.2 (1982) (Stevens, J., concurring in judgment) (“The risk that governmental
approval of some and disapproval of others will be perceived as favoring one religion over another is an important
risk the Establishment Clause was designed to preclude.”).
239. See Lee, 455 U.S. at 261 (finding a belief against paying social security taxes did not create an
exemption from paying them); Fulton v. City of Philadelphia, 922 F.3d 140, 162–65 (2019) (finding that foster
care was not an “intrinsically religious activity” and therefore did not qualify the claimant as experiencing a
substantial burden on religious conduct).
240. Fulton, 922 F.3d at 162–65.
241. 71 PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN. § 2403 (West 2021).
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unacceptable ‘business of evaluating the relative merits of differing religious
claims.’”242
Most definitions of strict scrutiny use a qualifying term for burdens like
“substantial,” but RFPA’s definition is highly specified.243 None of the opinions
the Court issued for Fulton mention RFPA, and the majority opinion never uses
the word “substantial.”244 However, both Justice Barrett and Justice Alito’s
concurrences reference the substantial qualification for burdens.245 Furthermore,
the Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Alito discuss the Catholic faith’s long history
of care for children in Philadelphia and elsewhere, dating back to the 18th
century.246 By reaching a unanimous decision on narrow grounds, the Chief Justice
may have avoided a dissent.247 A dissent to these opinions could have evaluated
how fundamental excluding same-sex parents—or caring for the well-being of
children, for that matter—is to the modern Catholic faith.248
If judges should avoid evaluating what is fundamental to a person’s religion,
then under strict scrutiny, courts would need to apply the compelling interest
requirement to all claims from religious objectors, and that invites anarchy.249 The
nation “cannot afford the luxury” of presuming every regulation is invalid against
religious objectors unless it protects “an interest of the highest order.”250
Undermining all statutes that fail to meet this lofty standard would permit a
person—merely by virtue of one’s own beliefs—to become a law unto oneself.251
The standard of review the Court articulated in Smith and Lukumi does not
require religious evaluations nor a “dizzying set of maneuvers” to avoid them. 252

242. See Emp. Div., Dep’t of Human Res. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 887 (1990) (citing Lee, 455 U.S. at 263
n.2) (arguing against the notion that qualifying the burden lessens the constitutional anomaly).
243. See 71 PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN. § 2403 (West 2021) (defining four ways to substantially
burden religious conduct).
244. Fulton v. City of Philadelphia, 141 S. Ct. 1868 (2021).
245. Id. at 1883 (Barrett, J., concurring in judgment); id. at 1890, 1924 (Alito, J., concurring in judgment).
246. Id. at 1874–75; id. at 1885 (Alito, J., concurring in judgment).
247. Damon Linker, SCOTUS Sides with Liberalism in Fulton v. Philadelphia, YAHOO! NEWS (June 17,
2021), https://news.yahoo.com/scotus-sides-liberalism-fulton-v-161605911.html (on file with the University of
the Pacific Law Review) (noting that a “sweeping outcome” would have likely “forced the court’s liberal justices
into dissent”).
248. See generally Brief of Amici Curiae 27 Roman Catholics in Support of Respondents at 13–24, Fulton
v. City of Philadelphia, 140 S. Ct. 1104 (2020) (No. 19-123) (noting the extensive theological support within the
Catholic church for welcoming not rejecting LGBTQ people); Harold Brubaker, Philly Archdiocese Expects to
Pay $126 Million in Priest Sex-Abuse Reparations, PHILA. INQUIRER (May 5, 2020),
https://www.inquirer.com/business/catholic-archdiocese-philadelphia-sex-abuse-payouts-reparations-fund20200505.html (on file with the University of the Pacific Law Review) (noting CSS along with St. Charles
Borromeo Seminary and the Office for Catholic Education “paid $28 million to the archdiocese to help cover
reparations” for sex-abuse reparations in December 2019 and “committed to lend the archdiocese $15 million to
help pay claims”).
249. Emp. Div., Dep’t of Human Res. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 888 (1990) (arguing that limiting the
compelling interest test is unworkable).
250. Id.
251. Id. at 885 (citing Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 167 (1878)).
252. See Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 531 (1993) (“Although
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Under rational basis review, a court must determine whether the state action is
legitimate, neutral, and generally applicable.253 If so, the law applies to everyone
in the government’s jurisdiction, regardless of religious beliefs.254 Rational basis
enables the judiciary to promote governance without preference for a religion’s
adherents, which is the aim of the First Amendment’s Religion Clauses.255 A
judicial focus on nonreligious criteria also protects believers from the government
forcing them to account for their religion; as President Jefferson observed, the
government can only legitimately regulate actions, not beliefs.256
2. Unworkability in the Minefield
The Court’s recent inconsistent decisions further suggest that its
accommodationist doctrine is unworkable in practice.257 Some scholars even argue
that decisions like Burwell “resurrect the ideal of private ordering and the
resistance to redistribution,” a classic form of judicial overreach.258 If the Court
fails to avoid inconsistency and overreach, it threatens the legitimacy of the
institution itself.259
The most prominent example of inconsistency involving the Religion Clauses
came in the 2017 term and begins with Masterpiece Cakeshop.260 There, the Court
found that members of the Commission made statements constituting
the practice of animal sacrifice may seem abhorrent to some, ‘religious beliefs need not be acceptable, logical,
consistent, or comprehensible to others in order to merit First Amendment protection.’”); Smith, 494 U.S. at 885–
86; see also Fulton, 141 S. Ct. at 1929 (Gorsuch, J. concurring in judgment) (describing the majority’s opinion’s
avoidance).
253. Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, 508 U.S. at 531, 543; Smith, 494 U.S. at 879.
254. Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, 508 U.S. at 531; Smith, 494 U.S. at 879 (1990); Wisconsin v.
Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 246–47 (1972) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
255. See United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 263 n.2 (1982) (Stevens, J., concurring in judgment) (“The
risk that governmental approval of some and disapproval of others will be perceived as favoring one religion over
another is an important risk the Establishment Clause was designed to preclude.”); see also supra Part II
(discussing the creation and interaction between the Religion Clauses).
256. Jefferson’s Letter to the Danbury Baptists, supra note 45.
257. Compare Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colo. Civil Rights Comm’n, 138 S. Ct. 1719, 1729 (2018)
(finding impermissible governmental hostility in commissioner’s remarks that using religious liberty to justify
discrimination is a “despicable piece of rhetoric”), with Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392, 2400–01 (2018)
(Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (criticizing the Court’s failure to find animus in a third executive order banning travel
from several mostly Muslim nations despite the President’s campaign statements).
258. See generally Elizabeth Sepper, Free Exercise Lochnerism, 115 COLUM. L. REV. 1453 (2015) (noting
that “legal scholars have long recognized a link between Lochner and the Free Speech Clause of the First
Amendment” and arguing that “[t]his interpretation of religious liberty, like freedom of contract before it, poses
a threat to the regulatory state”).
259. See Jeffrey Rosen, John Roberts Is Just Who the Supreme Court Needed, ATLANTIC (July 13, 2020),
https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2020/07/john-roberts-just-who-supreme-court-needed/614053/ (on
file with the University of the Pacific Law Review) (reporting on Chief Justice John Roberts’s efforts to “maintain
the Court’s bipartisan legitimacy at a time when the other branches have lost their own.”).
260. Compare 138 S. Ct. 1719, 1729 (2018) (invalidating an ordinance based on off-the-cuff statements
of a county commissioner), with Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392, 2400–01 (2018) (upholding executive action
despite repeated campaign rhetoric).
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impermissible hostility toward religion when the First Amendment demands
neutrality.261 Justice Kennedy’s opinion for the majority specifically highlighted a
commissioner’s statement as disparaging and questioning the claimant’s sincerity:
Freedom of religion and religion has been used to justify all kinds of
discrimination throughout history, whether it be slavery, whether it be the
holocaust . . . we can list hundreds of situations where freedom of religion
has been used to justify discrimination. And to me it is one of the most
despicable pieces of rhetoric that people can use to—to use their religion
to hurt others.262
Justice Kennedy framed this observation as describing the claimant’s religion
as “despicable” or “insubstantial and even insincere.”263 But on its face, this
comment does not reflect animus against religion; it explains “why the invocation
of religion is not a reason to allow individuals to disregard laws” designed to
protect historically disadvantaged groups.264
The Court further cited the disparity between how the Commission treated this
baker compared to other bakers who refused to bake cakes that combined bible
verses with demeaning messages about homosexuality.265 Justice Kennedy wrote
“an attempt to account for the difference in treatment elevates one view of what is
offensive over another and itself sends a signal of official disapproval of [the
baker’s] religious beliefs.”266 But a lawful request for a vendor’s advertised service
is fundamentally different than a request to create demeaning speech as a targeted
violation of democratically enacted anti-discrimination laws.267
Yet only a few weeks later, the Court declined to find hostility in President
Donald Trump’s third executive order banning travel from several mostly Muslim
countries, despite his relentless campaign rhetoric.268 The Court refused to search
“into the persuasiveness of the President’s justifications” because it was
inconsistent with traditional deference to the office.269 Justice Sonia Sotomayor
reminded the majority that the President advertised his policy “openly and
unequivocally as a ‘total and complete shutdown of Muslims entering the United

261. Masterpiece Cakeshop, 138 S. Ct. at 1732.
262. Id. at 1729.
263. Id.
264. CHEMERINSKY & GILLMAN, supra note 30, at 153.
265. Masterpiece Cakeshop, 138 S. Ct. at 1730–31.
266. Id.
267. See COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 24-34-601 (West 2021) (“It is a discriminatory practice and unlawful
for a person, directly or indirectly . . . to publish, circulate, issue, display, post, or mail any written, electronic, or
printed communication, notice, or advertisement that indicates that . . . an individual’s patronage or presence at a
place of public accommodation is unwelcome, objectionable, unacceptable, or undesirable because . . . sexual
orientation.”).
268. Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392, 2409 (2018).
269. Id.
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States.’”270 Her dissent cited Lukumi’s requirements that the judicial investigation
search beyond facial neutrality, and she lamented leaving the discriminatory policy
in place “behind a façade of national-security concerns.”271 Deference to the
executive branch’s reasoning is another strongly held, traditional judicial norm.272
Yet the Court’s sensitivity to a state-level civil rights commissioner’s off-the-cuff
statements remains difficult to reconcile with its refusal to acknowledge the import
of the President’s repeated campaign statements.273
The Court’s recent inconsistency goes beyond religious liberty claims; it also
came perilously close to overturning recent abortion precedent in June Medical
Services, LLC. v. Russo.274 In a 5–4 decision, the Court narrowly avoided
upholding a Louisiana statute that was “almost word-for-word identical” to a law
that the Court ruled “imposed an ‘undue burden’ on abortion access” only two
years prior.275 If Russo appeared before the current Court without Justice Ginsburg,
the outcome may have been different.276
Given the present existential threats to the Court’s sociological, moral, and
legal legitimacy, such blatant judicial inconsistency carries grave risk.277 Critics
charge that the current composition of the Court—and the federal judiciary atlarge—is the result of “court stacking,” or taking unprecedented, controversial
actions “to game the process and get more judges for your side.”278 In response,
President Joseph R. Biden has created a commission that will consider inter alia
whether to expand membership of the Court, a practice critics commonly disparage
as “court packing.”279 Recent Court decisions legitimizing partisan

270. Id. at 2433.
271. Id.
272. Id. at 2409.
273. Compare Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colo. Civil Rights Comm’n, 138 S. Ct. 1719, 1729 (2018)
(invalidating an ordinance based on off-the-cuff statements of a county commissioner), with Trump v. Hawaii,
138 S. Ct. 2392, 2433 (2018) (upholding executive action despite repeated campaign rhetoric).
274. 140 S. Ct. 2103, 2112 (2020).
275. June Med. Servs. L.L.C. v. Russo, 140 S. Ct. 2103, 2112 (2020).
276. See generally Sarah McCammon, A Look at Amy Coney Barrett’s Record on Abortion Rights, NPR
(Sept. 28, 2020, 5:18 PM), https://www.npr.org/2020/09/28/917827735/a-look-at-amy-coney-barretts-record-onabortion-rights (on file with the University of the Pacific Law Review) (reviewing Justice Barrett’s history and
noting that President Donald Trump promised to appoint only justices committed to reversing abortion precedent).
277. See Tara Leigh Grove, The Supreme Court’s Legitimacy Dilemma, 132 HARV. L. REV. 2240, 2244
(2019) (reviewing RICHARD F. FALLON, JR., LAW AND LEGITIMACY IN THE SUPREME COURT (2018)) (defining
social legitimacy as whether the public “view[s] the legal system . . . as worthy of respect and obedience,” moral
legitimacy as a normative concept concerning whether the public “should” obey or respect the system, and legal
legitimacy as whether justices were using “interpretive methods that are generally accepted within the legal
culture”).
278. Aaron Blake, The GOP’s Court-Stacking, WASH. POST (Oct. 12, 2020, 11:30 AM),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2020/10/12/no-gop-didnt-engage-court-packing-it-did-plenty-courtstacking/ (on file with the University of the Pacific Law Review).
279. Press Release, The White House, President Biden to Sign Executive Order Creating the Presidential
Commission on the Supreme Court of the United States (Apr. 9, 2021) (on file with the University of the Pacific
Law Review).
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gerrymandering as merely a “political question” do little to quell fears that
powerful interests are improperly manipulating the system.280
Chief Justice Roberts has warned that public perception of the Court acting as
a political weapon threatens its legitimacy as an institution.281 Gamesmanship on
all sides like court packing, court stacking, and gerrymandering diminish the
credibility of the judiciary and provoke the public to question whether the Court is
worthy of respect or obedience.282 However, moderating jurisprudence only to
ward off criticism would also diminish the Court’s legitimacy.283
Avoidance is a powerful argument when faced with navigating this
minefield.284 But in our increasingly polarized society, conflict between these
interests is inevitable.285 When the next conflict comes, the Court can strengthen
its legitimacy by fortifying the separation of church and state to protect believers
and nonbelievers alike.286 This Comment urges doing that by upholding Smith and
applying rational basis.287 However, the Court can also do this by finding a
government’s action narrowly tailored to a compelling interest that justifies an
incidental burden on religion.288
D. Entering the Minefield
This Section does not evaluate whether anti-discrimination regulations place a
substantial burden on the Catholic religion; legal analysis should “keep out of the
business” of judging what is “fundamental” to a faith.289 Instead, this Comment
assumes arguendo that anti-discrimination regulations do place a substantial
burden on religion.290 However, this Comment also argues that the City’s actions
used the least restrictive means necessary to further a compelling interest justifying
the incidental burden on religion.291 Subsection 1 argues that the City had a

280. See generally Rucho v. Common Cause, 139 S. Ct. 2484 (2019) (holding that partisan gerrymandering
claims are nonjusticiable political questions that require political solutions).
281. Rosen, supra note 259.
282. See Grove, supra note 277, at 2242–44 (2019) (describing how “constitutional hardball” calls
commentators to question the legitimacy of the Court).
283. See id. at 2259–63 (questioning the legitimacy of “switches in time”).
284. Transcript of Oral Argument at 40, Fulton v. City of Philadelphia, 140 S. Ct. 1104 (2020) (No. 19123) (reporting Justice Alito’s noting the “strong policy” of constitutional avoidance).
285. Hoffman, supra note 8; Gillman & Chemerinsky, supra note 21.
286. See Brief of Professors Ira C. Lupu, Frederick Mark Gedicks, William P. Marshall, and Robert W.
Tuttle as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondents at 9, Fulton v. City of Philadelphia, 141 S. Ct. 1868 (2021)
(No. 19-123) (“Protecting religious liberty interests as part of more general rights maintained crucial church-state
boundaries, as courts could base their decisions on broader nonreligious principles, and therefore were not
required to evaluate questions of religiosity.”).
287. See supra Sections V.A–B.
288. See infra Section V.D.
289. See supra Section V.B (discussing why strict scrutiny’s evaluation of religion is inherently offensive).
290. Infra Subsections V.D.1–2.
291. Infra Subsections V.D.1–2.
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compelling interest in eradicating discrimination in the foster care system.292
Subsection 2 examines the financial realities to demonstrate the City narrowly
tailored its actions to the least restrictive means necessary to achieve its compelling
interest in equality in foster care services.293
1. Compelling Interest
Eradicating discrimination is a compelling government interest that impacts
the City’s ability to administer foster care.294 Excluding otherwise qualified
applicants narrows the foster-parent pool and harms children by leaving them in
foster care longer.295 Furthermore, the Court has ruled that the Constitution
guarantees same-sex parents the same rights as heterosexual parents.296 Ensuring
equality in public services “plainly serves compelling state interests of the highest
order.”297 The lower courts held that CSS’s foster parent screening was a public
accommodation under the City’s Fair Practice Ordinance because CSS “publicly
solicits prospective foster parents and provide professional ‘services’ to the
public.”298 However, the Court avoided applying the Fair Practice Ordinance by
holding that foster care services are not a public accommodation under state law.299
Permitting discriminatory policies of foster care agencies—whose primary
goal is to find suitable homes for children—deters qualified applicants from
entering the foster care system.300 LGBT parents are seven times more likely to
raise adopted or foster children compared to heterosexual couples.301 However,
same-sex couples may be less likely to enter the applicant pool out of fear that the
process will expose them to indignities.302 Alienating such a vital source of
qualified applicants narrows the foster-parent pool and is a detriment to the welfare
of children in the system.303 Furthermore, discriminatory policies can stigmatize

292. Infra Subsection V.D.1.
293. Infra Subsection V.D.2.
294. See Fulton v. City of Philadelphia, 922 F.3d 140, 163 (2019), rev’d by 141 S. Ct. 1868 (2021). (“It’s
black-letter law that ‘eradicating discrimination’ is a compelling interest.” (citing Roberts v. Jaycees, 468 U.S.
609, 623 (1984))).
295. AM. BAR ASS’N, HOUSE OF DELEGATES RESOLUTION 113, at 5 (Jan. 28, 2019). Contra Fulton v. City
of Philadelphia, 141 S. Ct. 1868, 1882 (2021).
296. Pavan v. Smith, 137. S. Ct. 2075, 2078 (2017).
297. Roberts v. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 624 (1984).
298. Fulton, 141 S. Ct. 1868, 1927 (2021) (Gorsuch, J., concurring in judgment).
299. Id. at 1881.
300. See AM. BAR ASS’N, HOUSE OF DELEGATES RESOLUTION 113 at 5 (Jan. 28, 2019) (“Allowing an
agency to discriminate against LGBT parents sends a clear message—the agency’s religious and moral beliefs
are superior to their core mission of finding loving, permanent homes for children.”).
301. Id. at 6 (citing research from UCLA’s Williams Institute).
302. Transcript of Oral Argument at 79, Fulton v. City of Philadelphia, 140 S. Ct. 1104 (2020).
303. AM. BAR ASS’N, HOUSE OF DELEGATES RESOLUTION 113 at 5–6 (Jan. 28, 2019).
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the system’s LGBT children, who also comprise an outsized portion of the pool
compared to the general population.304
Same-sex couples are not the only potential foster parents the government
harms by funding religiously motivated discrimination.305 Aimee Madonna—an
experienced foster-parent—never considered herself a religious minority until
Miracle Hill Ministries rejected her from their foster care program for being the
wrong kind of Christian.306 Miracle Hill Ministries rejected Madonna because she
is Catholic, and the South Carolina foster care agency only works with evangelical
Protestant families—even requiring applicants to sign a statement of faith.307
Madonna started speaking out publicly to express concern over how other potential
foster parents might react to foster agency policies that discriminate against
prospective parents.308
CSS argues that it has never actually excluded a same-sex couple because no
same-sex couple has applied there.309 Even so, that could be the result of the
dissuading effect that occurs when government funds faith-based discrimination
through foster care contracts.310 Furthermore, the newspaper article that triggered
the City to act reported that another religious agency in the program did turn
potential parents away under the same policy.311 The majority emphasized that the
City must justify denying an exemption specifically to CSS.312 Finding that CSS’s
discriminatory policy alone is sufficient to warrant narrowly tailored action
balances the City’s responsibility to provide religious exemptions when the City
possesses the mere mechanism of an exemption.313
2. Narrow Tailoring
The City’s decision to not renew its foster care screening contract with CSS
was the least restrictive means necessary to further the compelling interest of
304. Transcript of Oral Argument at 64, Fulton, 140 S. Ct. 1104 (2020) (No. 19-123).
305. See Aimee Madonna, Children Are Hurt When Agencies Use Religious Litmus Tests to Provide Foster
Care, STATE (Nov. 4, 2020), https://www.thestate.com/opinion/opn-columns-blogs/article246958167.html (on
file with the University of the Pacific Law Review) (providing a mother’s experience of rejection despite her
family’s long history of foster care).
306. Id.
307. Id.; see also Lydia Curie, I Was Barred from Becoming a Foster Parent Because I Am Jewish, JEWISH
TELEGRAPHIC AGENCY (Feb. 5, 2019, 5:46 PM), https://www.jta.org/2019/02/05/opinion/i-was-barred-frombecoming-a-foster-parent-because-i-am-jewish (on file with the University of the Pacific Law Review) (reporting
her experience with Miracle Hill as a Jewish prospective parent).
308. Madonna, supra note 305.
309. Transcript of Oral Argument at 64–65, Fulton, 140 S. Ct. 1104 (2020) (No. 19-123) (reporting Justice
Breyer’s comments).
310. See id. at 72 (referencing the American Bar Association’s study that discriminatory policies dissuade
parent participation).
311. Terruso, supra note 13.
312. Fulton, 141 S. Ct. at 1881 (2021).
313. Id. at 1879.
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eradicating discrimination in foster care.314 The City did not sever its relationship
with CSS over this dispute.315 The City did not even claim breach of contract for
failing to adhere to its anti-discrimination terms; the City simply did not choose to
renew the foster care screening contract with CSS to avoid becoming “a party to
discrimination.”316
The numbers behind the City’s continued engagement with CSS further
demonstrates its narrow tailoring.317 The City continued to engage in contracts with
CSS worth tens of millions of dollars per year, including other foster care
functions.318 Foster-care screening accounts for less than 12% of the annual
funding the City provides CSS and less than 8% overall.319 The City pursued its
compelling interest of equal treatment in foster care by limiting its action to CSS’s
screening contract while continuing to engage with CSS in foster care services.320
Despite all this conflict, if the Court found for the City in Fulton and strengthened
Smith, religious organizations still could have continued to participate in the foster
care services market.321 CSS can continue to thrive in the fulfillment of its religious
mission to serve needy children of Philadelphia without forcing the City to fund
its discrimination against same-sex couples.322
VI. CONCLUSION
Chief Justice Roberts may have saved Smith from an untimely demise in
Fulton, but even his “greatest judicial magic trick” yet cannot make the conflict
between anti-discrimination and religious liberty issues disappear.323 Unless the
Court reinforces Smith’s rational basis, religious liberty advocates will continue to
challenge laws.324 In the meantime, the targets and collateral victims of religious

314. See supra Sections III.A, C (describing the development of this standard through Sherbert, Yoder,
and 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb(b)(1) (West 2021)).
315. Transcript of Oral Argument at 66, Fulton, 140 S. Ct. 1104 (2020) (No. 19-123).
316. Id. at 66.
317. Id. at 66–67.
318. Id.
319. See id. at 66–67 (reporting the City’s argument that stopping the “parent pool” function with CSS
only resulted in rescinding $2 million of the $17–19 million that the City gave to CSS annually for foster care;
CSS still receives $26 million of funding in total from the City).
320. See Transcript of Oral Argument at 66–67, Fulton v. City of Philadelphia, 140 S. Ct. 1104 (2020)
(No. 19-123) (describing the City’s limited action).
321. See id. at 86 (reporting the City’s argument that it does not monopolize the market and still engages
with CSS); see also Faith-Based Adoption Laws in 2020: What’s Going on with Fulton v. Philadelphia?,
ADOPTIONS TOGETHER (Feb. 26, 2020, 11:22 AM), https://www.adoptionstogether.org/blog/2020/02/26/faithbased-adoption-laws-fulton-v-philadephia/ (on file with the University of the Pacific Law Review) (noting eleven
states statutorily protect funding for faith-based adoption services).
322. See Transcript of Oral Argument at 66, Fulton, 140 S. Ct. 1104 (2020) (No. 19-123) (relaying the
City’s concern about being “a party to discrimination”).
323. Stern, supra note 7.
324. Gillman & Chemerinsky, supra note 21; Holly Hoffman, supra note 8.
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discrimination will continue to experience indignities and other tangible harms,
funded by a government that otherwise promises equality.325
Accommodationist interpretation leads courts into a “minefield” when
considering claims involving the Free Exercise Clause.326 Determining whether
government substantially burdened religion requires evaluating religious beliefs,
which is not appropriate work for judges.327 Requiring the government to have a
compelling interest promotes religious exemptions and permits a person—by
virtue of one’s own beliefs—to become a law unto oneself.328 Religious
exemptions—and particularly state RFRAs that protect religious objectors in cases
where the government is not a party—create a constitutional anomaly: a private
right to ignore neutral, generally applicable laws.329 Such exemptions constitute
government preference for religion, which is contrary to the Establishment
Clause’s aim.330
In free exercise claims, courts should avoid strict scrutiny because it requires
evaluating religious belief.331 Rational basis protects religion from governmental
interference because it does not ask people to account for their religion nor require
a “dizzying set of maneuvers” to avoid doing so.332 When the Court inevitably
confronts its next free exercise claim, it should adhere to existing precedent and
apply rational basis when neutral, generally applicable government action creates
incidental burdens on religion.333 By doing so, the Court can strengthen the
separation of church and state, which protects believers and nonbelievers alike
from harmful interference.334

325. See supra Section V.D.1 (discussing the harm that government-funded religious discrimination brings
in the foster care context).
326. Supra Section V.C.
327. Supra Section V.C.
328. Emp. Div., Dep’t of Human Res. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 885 (1990) (citing Reynolds v. United
States, 98 U.S. 145, 167 (1878)).
329. City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 513 (1997); Smith, 494 U.S. at 885–86.
330. See United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 263 n.2 (1982) (Stevens, J., concurring in judgment) (arguing
against the risk of perceived governmental preference for religion).
331. Supra Section V.C.
332. Supra Section IV.B.
333. Supra Section V.A–B.
334. See Brief of Professors Ira C. Lupu, Frederick Mark Gedicks, William P. Marshall, and Robert W.
Tuttle as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondents at 9, Fulton v. City of Philadelphia, 141 S. Ct. 1868 (2021)
(No. 19-123) (“Protecting religious liberty interests as part of more general rights maintained crucial church-state
boundaries, as courts could base their decisions on broader nonreligious principles, and therefore were not
required to evaluate questions of religiosity.”).
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